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I. Introduction  
 
 
The Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC), 
is foreign aid that aims for the economic development and welfare of developing countries. 
There are two major agents involved in the distribution of aid. One is a donor group 
consisting of rich countries that provide aid, and the other is a recipient group consisting 
of poor countries that need aid. In the past, from 1950 to 2005, there used to be a 
competition in the recipient group to get more aid due to the chronic poverty and pandemic 
disease hampering economic growth in most of the poor countries. On the other hand, since 
2005, we face a new phenomenon of competition in the donor group to provide more aid 
to the recipient counties as China rapidly increased its aid, and the recipient group has more 
choices from whom to receive aid as a result. 
 
Why do the donors compete to provide aid? One reason is that donors can achieve different 
types of economic and political benefits by offering aid. Fuchs et al. (2013) argued that aid 
is provided based on the donor's incentive. For example, from the donor's perspective, aid 
can provide more access to natural resources located in the recipient country or influence 
political support in the voting system of the United Nations. This study will have a closer 
look at China's aid comparing it to one of the traditional donors: the US. 
 
The United States has been a top donor and a dominant power in Africa. According to 
USAID, the US provided 46 billion USD as foreign aid worldwide in 2018 and spent 12 




education.1  However, after the US 2008 mortgage crisis, the US switched its priority of 
budget allocation, focusing more on domestic issues at the expense of international ones. 
As a result, US aid to Africa rapidly decreased for a period after 2008; and although it has 
subsequently increased, it could have been much higher had the increasing trend of aid 
before 2008 been maintained. 
 
On the other hand, according to Brautigam (2011), China increased its aid significantly 
since 2006 and became a rising donor in Africa. The key difference of China’s aid is that 
its aid allocation seems to be more strategically targeted on natural resources and raw 
materials, unlike the US.  Moreover, the current situation in Africa is that the recipient 
countries welcome Chinese aid money as a new source of finance for their economic 
development, while traditional donors—rich countries having a long history of offering 
aid—have been suffering from economic depression and debt crisis. As a result of China’s 








                                                




II. Literature  
 
The unprecedented and different aid activity of China as a new donor brings debate in the 
international society on whether it has a positive or negative impact on African countries' 
economic growth. Some observers criticize that the behavior of Chinese aid is motivated 
by China's economic benefits and market expansion. Dreher et al. (2018) argue that 
Chinese economic incentives explain its aid allocation better than political incentives. 
Shinn (2019) insists that the import of inexpensive Chinese products is preferable to 
African consumers than similar local goods, making local producers lose their 
competitiveness in the domestic market.  
 
On the other hand, others consider China’s aid as a new chance for Africa. Shinn (2019) 
suggests that China’s aid can increase the utility of African consumers by offering more 
choice of goods at lower prices. Also, Woods (2008) views China's aid as a new source of 
development finance. Brautigam (2011) provides a qualitative analysis of China’s aid in 
her book and insists that China's aid has a unique feature of cost-efficiency. Since China's 
aid is offered as a type of tied aid, the aid is combined with trade and investment like a 
package. For instance, China offers aid to build a road to the mining site and have a priority 
contract to import rare ore from the local mine. So, the aid works as a booster to promote 
trade in this case. 
 
There is also a suspicion on which sector China mainly provides its aid. Dreher and Fuchs 
(2016) suspect that China is strategically targeting natural resources and raw materials but 




trend of the Chinese population in the African mining sector as evidence of the increasing 
amount of Chinese aid. It is because Chinese aid brings Chinese labor as a tied package 
with infrastructural projects to the developed mining site.  
 
Despite ongoing debates, suspicions, and worries about the effect of China's aid, little 
research has been done to measure the aggregated impact on African countries. Thus, this 
study aims to reveal whether China’s aid is good or bad for economic development in poor 
African countries from the recipient's perspective. In order to answer the main research 
question, the study will investigate three sub-questions as following:   
 
1) How much aid does China offer Africa? 
● To what extent has Chinese financial inflows to Africa been growing?  
● How significant is the ratio of China’s aid comparing to that of western 
countries’ in Africa?  
 
2) How is China’s aid different from OECD assistance in Africa? 
● Infrastructure, trade, agriculture 
● Aid mixed with trade and investment (concessional) 
● No condition on governance or domestic politics 
 
3) What is the impact of China’s aid in Africa?  




III. How much aid does China offer Africa? 
 
China's aid has been significantly growing for the last two decades, as shown in Figure 1. 
According to the foreign aid data officially announced by the Ministry of Finance in China, 
it offered only 631 million USD in 2003.  By 2018 this had increased to 3,277 million USD, 
which is more than 500% growth.2   If China had not suffered from a stock market crash in 
2016, it could have been even higher.    
 
 
Figure 1.China's aid (official) to the world, 2003-2017	
Source:	China	Africa	Research	Initiative	(2020).	Johns	Hopkins	University	
                                                





Figure 2. Total ODA to the world: G7 donors vs. China (official) 2003-2018	
Source:	OECD	library	statistics	(2020). 
 
Figure 2 above shows the significant increase of China's total foreign aid to the world, 
compared to that of G7 donors, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. These are generally the top donors and have political 
power in the United Nations. They are also core members of the OECD DAC donor club.3 
The blue line on the top shows the US as a leading donor.  Approximately 26% of the US 
aid in 2017 goes to Africa.4 There are two downturns of the US aid due to the mortgage 
crisis in 2008 and “mini-recession” from slowing down the business investment between 
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2015 and 2016. 5  Although it recovered to the original level, considering the rapidly 
increasing trend until 2005, it could have been higher if the US had not struggled with 
domestic financial issues.  The red line at the bottom is China's aid, officially announced 
by the Chinese government. Comparing to the US aid 35,578 million USD6 in 2017, 





Figure 3.China’s aid: estimated (in Africa only) vs. official (to the world) (million, USD)	
Source:	Aid	Data	(2020).	William	and	Mary’s	research	lab	
	
                                                
5 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/upshot/mini-recession-2016-little-known-big-impact.html 
6 USAID (2020).  




However, there have been many suspicions from the G7 donors that China's official aid 
seems much smaller than what China actually provides, and it seems that China 
intentionally could have reported a false amount of aid to disguise its strategy of foreign 
policy. It is a plausible scenario because China is not an OECD DAC member, so China is 
not required to report official bilateral aid data to any international organization.  On the 
other hand, G7 countries, including the United States, are required to report all of their aid 
data to the OECD DAC committee and have a peer review once in four to five years as a 
member of the donor club.   
 
Figure 3 above compares the estimated amount of China's aid to African countries with the 
officially reported figures and documents a significant gap relative to the amount 
announced by the Chinese government. The official aid data is based on the disbursement 
that the Chinese government actually transferred to the recipient government. On the other 
hand, the estimated aid data has been collected in the field, based on the committed project 
size and duration from 2003 to 2014. For example, if there is road construction, an 
interviewer goes to the construction site and ask the workers how big the project size is, 
how long the construction will go on, and how much they are paid daily, and calculates the 
total estimated amount of project aided. This means that estimated aid data is based on the 
amount that China committed until the project ends, which is different from what has been 
spent yet. Therefore, this gap might come from the discrepancy between the commitment 
and disbursement of China’s aid because the Chinese government can commit the aid 
budget based on a 5-year or 10-year period and spend annually. For reference, OECD donor 




each other's aid behaviors.  In Figure 3, especially in 2013, it showed the most significant 
gap that estimated China's aid amount is 5,421 million USD, while the official data is 2,773 
million USD, which is almost two times. 
 
Since China does not report its aid data to international society, no one knows exactly how 
much China spends its aid to Africa. Due to the unavailability of official data and no clue 
except this estimated data, this study will use estimated China’s aid data to track China’s 
aid behavior. It will allow the study to estimate the impact of eventual aid inflows into the 
African continent from China, predict their impact, and evaluate whether they can bring a 
change in the current aid scheme in the view of recipients as well as donors. 
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Figure 4 shows how much China offers estimated aid to Africa compared to G7 donor 
countries. In the year 2013, the US provided 10,491 million USD to Africa,8  while China 
provided 5,421 million USD. 9 China's aid was approximately one-half of the US aid in 
2013 while it was one-eighth in 2003. Moreover, after 2011, China's aid is more than that 
every G7 country except the US, which are OECD DAC member countries as well as strong 
and influential donors in the field. The study notes that China’s aid data could be 
overestimated because it is based on project commitment, while G7 countries are based on 
annual disbursement. However, Figure 4 clearly describes the rapidly increasing trend of 
China's aid and significant increase over the last twenty years. Even if we cut down the 
estimation by one-fifth as assuming that all projects are five-year term projects to complete, 
China still provides significant amount of aid more than two or more of G7 countries. 
 
Major donor countries might want to reconsider the reasons to be bound as a DAC 
committee under its common regulations, while non-DAC donors can provide smaller 
amounts of aid and do business independently with the recipients. The reason that 
traditional donor countries such as G7 establish DAC donor's club is to increase their 
collective power over the recipient countries.10  However, China breaks this collective 
power by providing bilateral aid to African countries as a non-DAC member and taking a 
favorable economic position.   
 
                                                
8 OECD library stat (2020). 
9 Aid Data (2020).  




IV. How is China’s aid different in Africa? 
 
Traditional donors, the OECD DAC, including the US, mostly offer their aid on the human 
capital-building sector such as health, education, HIV/AIDS, malaria, humanitarian aid, 
etc. 11  Unlike traditional donors, China spends aid targeting the sectors of building 
infrastructure, promoting trade, and agriculture to import raw materials directly related to 
the donor's economic incentives.12 Also, China’s aid is tied to trade and investment such 
as a concessional loan that needs to be paid back, although the interest is very low. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a concessional loan is defined as a 
loan with either low interest rates below market interest rate or with long grace periods.13 
Regardless of this pay-back condition which is not imposed on traditional donor's aid, 
African countries welcome China's aid because there is no condition on governance of 
domestic politics. Since African countries had already suffered from severe economic 
structural adjustment implemented by World Bank or conditioning on good governance 
such as democracy guaranteeing periodical election which was imposed by traditional 
donors, they prefer using Chinese government loans without any political conditions but 
aided by lower interest rates. Again, China's aid works like a booster for a national loan in 
this case. 
 
Although there is a freedom for African countries to enjoy by accepting China's aid, it does 
not guarantee whether it can have a positive impact on African GDP. To better understand 
                                                
11 USAID (2020).  





how China’s aid affects African economies, this study will analyze the relationship 
between African countries’ GDP and the aid received from China. 
 
V. What is the impact of China’s aid in Africa? 
1. Data  
 
The study will use a panel data set consisting of annual GDP of each African country and 
annual aid received from China. The data period is from 2003 to 2014 when estimated 
bilateral aid data was available between China and African countries. The data unit is USD 
per year, and data sources are from the Chinese government official data, OECD library 
data, WTO trade volume, and UNCTAD trade data. 
 
2. Model  
 
The study starts with a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method with a fixed effect 
for each country as a baseline estimation of the association between China’s aid and 
African countries’ GDP. The fixed effects method is used in order to capture the impact of 
aid on GDP among African countries rather than the impact coming from the fixed 
variables such as landlocked position or whether or not a country has mineral deposits. By 
using a fixed effects regression, the previous studies (Novignon et al., 2012; Fayissa et al., 
2008; Ndikumana, 2000) were able to handle the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 




equation (1) below, the dependent variables are each African countries' GDP, and key 
independent variables are China's aid, market openness index which is the sum of country 
i’s export and import divided by its GDP at year t,  and G7 countries’ aid. It also has two 
intercepts to represent country fixed effects 𝛼" as an unobserved country-fixed effect which 
are invariant over time, and 𝜂$ is an unobserved time-fixed effect during the same year, 
where i represents a country and t represents a year.  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃"$ = 𝛼" + 𝛽+𝐶_𝐴𝐼𝐷"$ + 	𝛽1(𝑋 +𝑀)"$/𝐺𝐷𝑃"$ 	+ 𝛽7𝐺7_𝐴𝐼𝐷"$ + 𝜂$ + 𝜀"$         (1) 
 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃"$	is a measure of GDP (current USD) in a country i at time t  
• 𝐴𝐼𝐷"$ is a measure of China’s aid (current USD) to country i at time t 
• (𝑋 +𝑀)"$/𝐺𝐷𝑃"$		is an openness index of a country i at time t with world 
• 𝛼" is an unobserved country-fixed effect 
• 𝜂$ is an unobserved time-fixed effect 
• 𝜀"$ is an i.i.d. error term 
 
3. Instrumental variable 
 
One potential problem with this approach is that the OLS or the fixed effects analysis with 
panel data can be biased due to endogeneity if a correlation exists between the independent 
variable and error term (Wooldridge, 2002). In this study, it is possible that the amount of 




analysis, the study will also consider an instrumental variable (IV) estimation with fixed 
effects to handle the bias from endogeneity. 
 
A valid instrumental variable must be correlated with the explanatory variable but 
uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. To construct an appropriate instrument, 
this study starts with China’s aid to country i in 2006 and projects change from this base 
year using the growth of total China's aid between 2006 and year t. In other words: 
 
𝐼𝑉1 = 𝐴𝑖𝑑",1??@ ∗
B"CDEFG
B"CDEFHIIJ
              (2) 
First stage:  
    𝐶_𝐴𝐼𝐷"$ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝑉1"$ 	+ 𝜀"$            (3) 
 
The logic to set up is, if China increases its aid in year t comparing to 2006, then the country 
i receives more aid, which is proportional to what country i received in 2006. The study 
chooses the base year as 2006 because China officially announced the plan for a rapid 
increase of its aid toward Africa through its white paper of foreign policy. Additionally, 
since not all the countries received China’s aid from 2003, twenty-one out of twenty-four 
African countries received China's aid in the year 2006 at least, so it was able to minimize 
the number of losing observations.  
 
As an alternative, this study uses a second IV: 
 
𝐼𝑉2 = 𝐴𝑖𝑑",1??@ ∗
LMNDEFG
LMNDEFHIIJ





IV(2) uses the amount of China’s aid that African country i received in 2006 multiplying 
with the ratio of Chinese GDP in year t based Chinese GDP in 2006. Depending on the 
change of China GDP based on that of 2006, then the amount of aid that the country i 
receives is either positively or negatively proportional to what country i received in 2006. 
The study takes the same reason for choosing 2006 as a base year.  The study notes that, in 
the second stage regression, it drops the observations from 2003 to 2006 since it takes 2006 




Table 1 shows the results from OLS with random effect and OLS with fixed effects models 
of the relation between China's aid and African countries' GDP. The OLS estimator of 
model 1 is 5.604 and statistically significant at 90% confidence level. The coefficient size 
of OLS with the fixed effect of model 2 is similar to that of model 1 but is marginally less 
significant.  
 
Likewise, Table 2 shows the association between China's aid with lagged period and 
African GDP. Difference from Table 1, the OLS estimator with the random effect of model 
1 and the OLS estimator with fixed effects of model 2 illustrates 7.091 and 6.947 
respectively.  Also both are statistically significant with slightly larger magnitudes than 









VARIABLES AF_GDP AF_GDP 
   
C_aid_bilateral 5.604* 5.403 
 (3.359) (3.379) 
EM_AFGDP 4.479e+10 4.914e+10 
 (4.182e+10) (4.297e+10) 
G7_aid 8.997 8.419 
 (5.763) (5.836) 
D3_mkt_openness   
   
D4_political_conflict   
   
Constant 2.854e+10* 2.858e+10*** 
 (1.724e+10) (4.588e+09) 
   
Observations 192 192 
R-squared  0.044 
Number of country 24 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





VARIABLES FWD1_AFGDP FWD1_AFGDP 
   
C_aid_bilateral 7.091** 6.947** 
 (2.947) (2.963) 
EM_AFGDP 3.013e+10 3.290e+10 
 (3.694e+10) (3.768e+10) 
G7_aid 8.580* 8.154 
 (5.067) (5.117) 
D3_mkt_openness   
   
D4_polilitcal_conflict   
   
Constant 3.213e+10* 3.219e+10*** 
 (1.827e+10) (4.023e+09) 
   
Observations 192 192 
R-squared  0.063 
Number of country 24 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 















VARIABLES C_aid C_aid C_aid C_aid 
     
IV1 0.319*** 0.456***   
 
IV2 






EM_AFGDP -4.277e+08 -2.947e+08 -3.313e+08 -2.179e+08 
 (5.609e+08) (9.680e+08) (5.668e+08) (9.849e+08) 
G7_aid 0.268*** 0.251* 0.283*** 0.267** 
 (0.0946) (0.128) (0.0953) (0.129) 
Constant 3.691e+07 -4.767e+07 2.847e+07 -1.379e+08 
 (8.298e+07) (1.120e+08) (8.372e+07) (1.349e+08) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
R-squared  0.115  0.090 
Number of country 24 24 24 24 
     
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the first stage regression of the IV test. This stage examines 
whether the IVs have statistically significant correlations with China’s aid or not. The result 
explains that both IV(1) and IV(2) have strong correlations with China's aid. Specifically, 
the correlation between IV(1) and China's aid is 0.319 in the OLS model and 0.456 in the 
fixed effects model. IV(2) shows a stronger correlation than IV(1) as 0.537 with the OLS 
model and 1.008 with fixed effect models, respectively.  Having such a high correlation of 
1.008 in column (4) comes from adding 1 dollar to China's aid for each African country to 















VARIABLES AF_GDP AF_GDP AF_GDP AF_GDP 
     
C_aid_bilateral 67.80*** 87.55*** 67.51*** 89.92*** 
 (20.50) (30.08) (22.38) (34.21) 
EM_AFGDP 1.924e+10 9.773e+09 1.919e+10 9.616e+09 
 (7.583e+10) (9.303e+10) (7.604e+10) (9.568e+10) 
G7_aid -10.76 -16.83 -11.14 -17.17 
 (11.87) (15.38) (12.09) (16.04) 
D3_mkt_open   -4.991e+09 -1.577e+10 
   (4.494e+10) (5.711e+10) 
D4_pol_conflict   1.025e+09 -3.560e+09 
   (1.031e+10) (1.353e+10) 
Constant 1.966e+10** 1.684e+10 2.295e+10 2.812e+10 
 (8.510e+09) (1.067e+10) (3.187e+10) (4.020e+10) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
Number of country 24 24 24 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4 reports the second stage regression result of IV estimators. The IV(1) estimator 
with the fixed effect in model 3 is 67.80, and the IV(1) estimator with fixed effect after 
adding dummy variables of market openness and political conflict in model 5 is 67.51. 
Both represent that the magnitudes of IV(1) estimators are approximately twelve times 
larger than the magnitude of the OLS estimator in Table 1. Likewise, the IV(2) estimators 
in models 4 and 6 are 87.55 and 89.92, respectively, even sixteen times higher than the size 















VARIABLES FWD1_AFGDP FWD1_AFGDP FWD1_AFGDP FWD1_AFGDP 
     
C_aid_biateral 62.39*** 69.51*** 60.67*** 68.55*** 
 (18.14) (23.71) (19.44) (26.08) 
EM_AFGDP 6.327e+09 2.911e+09 6.258e+09 2.891e+09 
 (6.709e+10) (7.333e+10) (6.604e+10) (7.295e+10) 
G7_aid -8.887 -11.08 -9.125 -11.25 
 (10.50) (12.13) (10.50) (12.23) 
D3_mkt_open   5.928e+09 2.136e+09 
   (3.903e+10) (4.354e+10) 
D4_pol_conflict   3.605e+09 1.993e+09 
   (8.957e+09) (1.032e+10) 
Constant 2.427e+10*** 2.325e+10*** 1.969e+10 2.151e+10 
 (7.529e+09) (8.411e+09) (2.768e+10) (3.065e+10) 
     
Observations 192 192 192 192 
Number of country 24 24 24 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5 shows a similar result with the lagged period of China’s aid and African GDP 
compared to Table 4. The IV(1) estimator with fixed effect in model 3 is 62.39, and the 
IV(1) estimator with fixed effect after adding dummy variables of market openness and 
political conflict in model 5 is 60.67. Both represent that the magnitudes of IV(2) 
estimators are approximately nine times larger than the magnitude of the OLS estimator 
and they are less than the results of the same models compared to Table 4. Likewise, the 
IV(2) estimators in models 4 and 6 are 69.51 and 68.55, respectively, are approximately 
ten times higher than the size of the OLS estimator. Also, both of them are much less than 
the result of the same models comparing to Table 4. The estimator with lagged China’s aid 





One thing we can take from the above results is, since all the significant coefficients are 
consistently positive, there is convincing evidence that China's aid has a positive 
correlation with GDP in African countries. For reference, in the actual regression process, 
since available China's estimated aid data is limited from 2003 to 2014, it uses the observed 
forwarded African GDP rather than making lagged variables of China's aid data to avoid 
losing additional observations. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
From the regression result, the study finds that China’s aid has a positive relationship with 
the African GDP. Using an instrumental variable for China's aid, the study reveals that the 
OLS estimator with the fixed effect is downward biased to the IV estimator. This means 
that, while the OLS estimator suggests that more of China’s aid goes to the countries with 
low GDP, the IV estimator is able to capture a reverse causality that China provides aid to 
the country with a high GDP. As shown in the correlation coefficient figure 5 in Appendix, 
Nigeria (the fourteenth country listed below), the wealthiest nation in Africa, receives 
China's aid as other poor African countries do. Thus, using an instrumental variable enables 
this study to find the hidden behavior of China's aid, which is different from G7 donors. 
 
Another explanation for the difference between IV and OLS estimators could be an omitted 
variable problem that affects both the independent and dependent variables. Since the effect 




direct effect of China's aid on African GDP. Although the study considering that bilateral 
investment is the omitted variable, it is challenging to find the bilateral investment data 
between China and African countries who received aids since it is closed information. 
Moreover, the difference in the coefficient of China's aid between OLS with fixed effects 
and IV estimation can come from the measurement error. Although it is the best 
measurement so far, since this study used the estimated aid data collected in the field by 
capturing the total volume, the aid will inflow divided by 5 to 10 year periods. 
 
As for the implication of the result, from the recipient's view, China's aid on African GDP 
is not bad for African GDP growth. Considering that China recently announced a debt relief 
plan in 2018 for its recipient countries, it can reduce the current woes of indebting poor 
countries and increase the magnitude of its positive impact on Africa's economic 
development. It can also be used as a new financial source in the current economic 
depression in the world economy, which can relieve the poverty level in Africa. On the 
other hand, even though the aid is generally considered a positive impact factor in the 
recipient's view, it can negatively impact the donor's group by urging aid competition new 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics 
Variable	 	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	 Observations	
	       
country	 overall	 12.5	 6.934236	 1	 24	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 7.071068	 1	 24	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 0	 12.5	 12.5	 T	=						12	
	       
year	 overall	 2008.5	 3.458061	 2003	 2014	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 0	 2008.5	 2008.5	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 3.458061	 2003	 2014	 T	=						12	
	       
AF_GDP	 overall	 3.11E+10	 7.00E+10	 7.85E+08	 5.68E+11	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 6.38E+10	 1.75E+09	 3.20E+11	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 3.15E+10	 -1.86E+11	 2.79E+11	 T	=						12	
	       
FWD1_AF
GDP	
overall	 3.41E+10	 7.50E+10	 9.15E+08	 5.68E+11	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 7.03E+10	 1.93E+09	 3.53E+11	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 2.96E+10	 -1.88E+11	 2.50E+11	 T	=						12	
	       
C_aid_1	 overall	 2.68E+08	 5.33E+08	 1	 3.78E+09	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 2.83E+08	 1.14E+07	 1.07E+09	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 4.55E+08	 -7.99E+08	 3.10E+09	 T	=						12	
	       
EM__AFG
DP	
overall	 0.06666	 0.0895572	 0.001456	 0.462818	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 0.0820854	 0.015296	 0.367437	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 0.0392523	 -0.07591	 0.335848	 T	=						12	
	       
G7_aid	 overall	 5.36E+08	 7.96E+08	 -5.78E+07	 1.01E+10	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 4.50E+08	 4.47E+07	 1.87E+09	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 6.62E+08	 -1.16E+09	 8.78E+09	 T	=						12	
	       
D3_mktop
en	
overall	 0.670139	 0.4709809	 0	 1	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 0.4768045	 0	 1	 n	=						24	
	 within	 	 0.0565151	 0.586806	 1.586806	 T	=						12	
	       
D4_politic
_conflict	
overall	 0.243056	 0.429675	 0	 1	 N	=					288	
	 between	 	 0.2419185	 0	 0.5	 n	=						24	





Table 7. Summary results statistics of first-stage regressions for IV(1) 
 
IV(1)	 		 		 Underidentification	 Weak	identification	
Variable	 F(		1,			165)	 	P-val		 SW	Chi-sq(		1)	 	P-val		 SW	F(		1,			165)	













































Table 8. Summary results statistics of first-stage regressions for IV(2) 
 
IV(2)	 		 		 Underidentification	 Weak	identification	
Variable	 F(		1,			165)	 	P-val		 SW	Chi-sq(		1)	 	P-val		 SW	F(		1,			165)	













































Figure 5. Correlation between African GDP and China’s aid (base year 2006) 14 
	
                                                
14 Country code:  
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